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We examine the implementation of governance arrangements to extend ownership and 
control to employees and community stakeholders in social enterprises. Evidence from a 
sample of newly created public service social enterprises in England shows how the 
realisation of democratic ideals involves a gradual and often challenging process. Different 
outcomes are explained in terms of an interplay between the legal forms and representational 
mechanisms adopted and the enabling role of organisational culture. The paper contributes an 
analytic framework that captures the range of possible outcomes in terms of stakeholder 
versus stewardship forms of representation, and the cultural-psychological dimension of 
ownership. Organisations may find themselves at different stages in the journey towards the 
realisation of democratic ownership and governance. Conclusions are drawn for the field of 
social enterprise and non-profit research.  
 
Keywords 




At a time of renewed interest in the role and value of democratic participation in 
organisations that deliver crucial services to communities, there is a need for greater 
understanding of the challenges involved when introducing new forms of governance to 
facilitate this. This paper seeks to address the issues raised by empirically exploring the 
implementation of measures to extend democratic control and ownership to employees and 




We define social enterprises as organisations that trade primarily to support a social or 
environmental purpose and which often take ownership forms that restrict the distribution of 
profit to shareholders. A distinguishing feature of many social enterprises is their adoption of 
‘alternative’ mutual governance forms which allow for shared ownership and the 
participation of their employees and community stakeholders in organisational strategy 
(Cornforth 2004; Birchall and Simmons 2004; Byers, Anagnostopoulos and Brooke-Holmes 
2015). We define governance here as the ‘purposeful effort to guide, steer, control or manage 
sectors or facets of societies’ (Kooiman 1993, p.2). Previous research on social enterprise 
governance has focused on the effectiveness of governance models in balancing the economic 
and social missions of these ‘hybrid’ organisations (Doherty et al. 2014; Pestoff and Hulgard 
2016), and how stakeholders can be represented and involved in formal governance structures 
(Diochon 2010; Fazzi 2012; Low 2006, 2015; Kopel and Marini 2016; Low and Chinnock 
2008; Mason et al. 2007; Ohana et al. 2012; Spear et al. 2009). However, there is a gap in the 
research literature regarding the actual implementation and practices of democratic 
governance, and particularly so with respect to the increasingly diverse forms taken by social 
enterprises and other social economy organisations (Defourny and Nyssens 2017; Pestoff and 
Hulgard 2016; Sacchetti and Birchall 2018).  
 
We respond to this knowledge gap by empirically examining the implementation of 
governance arrangements to extend democratic ownership and control in a sub-set of social 
enterprises that have been ‘spun out’ from the public sector in England and described as 
‘public service mutuals’ by policy makers (Hazenberg and Hall 2016; Powell et al. 2018; 
Sepulveda et al. 2018; SEUK 2018). The notion of ‘public sector social enterprise’ is now 
established in the academic literature (Defourny and Nyssens 2017; Ridley-Duff and Bull 
2019), with Defourny and Nyssens (2017) identifying the public sector origin of these 
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organisations as a key feature, emerging as they have from the reconfiguration or 
externalisation of former public services and with the policy expectation that the newly 
created social enterprises will be more efficient and innovative than their public sector 
counterparts. In the UK, there has also been an expectation that there should be a significant 
degree of mutualism in the governance and ownership of these organisations, as with the 
‘social cooperative model’ in the typology of Defourny and Nyssens (2017). With these 
considerations in mind, we therefore address the following research question: What are the 
factors and processes affecting the implementation of democratic governance and ownership 
in public service social enterprises?  
 
Our focus on mutually owned public service social enterprises has a two-fold justification. 
First, while social enterprises in general often state democratic inclusivity as being a core 
aspect of their social missions and governance (Doherty et al. 2014; Pestoff and Hulgard 
2016), questions remain as to the relative roles of legal forms and other mechanisms for 
ensuring the participation of stakeholders. Second, there is a policy expectation that recently 
created spin-out social enterprises demonstrate a significant degree of mutualisation, with an 
emphasis on employee ownership, control and influence in how they are governed (Mutuals 
Taskforce 2011; 2012). Although there is limited research on this topic, what evidence there 
is indicates the variable extent to which such expectations are being fulfilled in practice 
(Hazenberg and Hall 2016; Sepulveda et al. 2018). Given recent policy interest and 
expectations, public service social enterprises offer a potentially fruitful context for further 
investigation. 
 
We develop a framework for understanding the choices and processes behind the adoption of 
different governance and ownership approaches, and implications for policy and practice. In 
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doing so, we address a gap in the literature by examining how engaging stakeholders in 
democratic action, as well as being dependent on the adoption of appropriate legal forms and 
representational mechanisms, also requires attention to the cultural-psychological dimension 
of ownership. Hence it is the interplay between the formal and less formal elements of 
governance that is at the heart of our analysis - an issue that has been little studied in the 
social enterprise and non-profit literature. 
 
The paper draws on qualitative evidence from a sample of 30 social enterprises in England, 
all of which had originated as ‘spin-outs’ from the public sector. The establishment of these 
pioneering organisations has been conditional on them being able to demonstrate a significant 
degree of employee and stakeholder ownership, influence and/or control in how they are run 
(Hazenberg and Hall 2016; Millar et al. 2012; Sepulveda 2015; Mutuals Taskforce 2011, 
2012; Transition Institute 2011, 2013). Hence, we seek to explore how such expectations are 
being fulfilled in practice and the challenges involved. Although the focus on public service 
social enterprises in a specific geographical and sectoral context is a limitation, we argue that 
the results have wider relevance for the field of social enterprise research and for policy and 
practice. 
 
Our theoretical approach draws upon two main sets of literature on organisational governance 
from which we synthesise our analytical framework. First, the literature on models of 
governance commonly examines and contrasts stewardship and stakeholder models in studies 
of for-profit and non-profit organisations (Diochon 2010; Low 2006, 2015; Mason et al. 
2007). The stewardship model, along with the principal-agent model, tends to predominate in 
analyses of private corporate contexts. The principal-agent model portrays CEOs and 
executive managers as self-interested ‘agents’ who pursue their own personal economic gain 
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at the expense of the shareholder or ‘principal’, whereas the stewardship model emphasises 
the role of managers and boards of directors as trustworthy and pro-organisation agents of the 
shareholders (Davis et al. 1997). Effective stewardship requires an appropriately designed 
organisation structure which can support and empowers the CEO (Donaldson and Davis 
1991, p.51). These agents are also expected to have the capacity and willingness ‘to balance 
different interests in the professional pursuit of the company strategy’ (Clarke 2005, p.604). 
Building on this perspective, Cornforth (2003) explores the notion of the stewardship model 
for the non-profit sector, where boards of directors (or governors) are specifically selected to 
represent users and beneficiary groups. The (multi-) stakeholder model, on the other hand, 
entails the direct involvement of employees, beneficiaries and other interested parties in 
ownership and decision making. Legitimate stakeholders can be any identifiable group or 
individual that can affect the achievement of the objectives of an organisation, or who are 
affected by the objectives of an organisation (Freeman and Reed 1983; Mason et al. 2007). 
These perspectives on stewardship versus stakeholder models inform our analysis and 
resulting typology of the managerial dimension of governance and pathways to 
democratisation.  
 
Second, we draw on the literature on the ownership of organisations (Carberry 2011; 
Humborstad 2014) and in particular that stream which examines different types of ownership. 
In order to develop a more holistic and dynamic perspective, we specifically explore and 
build upon the literature that distinguishes between ownership ‘as a legal property’ and 
ownership ‘as a psychological state of mind’ (Pierce et al. 1991; Pierce and Rodgers 2004). 
While the former concerns the formal dimension of governance, the latter suggests a need to 
attend to other less formal aspects relating to stakeholder agency, voice and sense of 
belonging, as well as the enabling role of leadership, organisational culture and practices 
7 
 
(Kruse and Blasi 1997; Wilkinson 1998). We propose that this distinction between types and 
dimensions of ownership is critical to understanding the different ‘imaginaries of ownership’ 
that may emerge from the processes of implementation, contestation and adjustment between 
leaders, employees, user communities and other stakeholders. 
 
The paper is divided into six sections, including this introduction. The findings from a review 
of the literature on theories of governance and ownership, from which our conceptual 
framework is developed, are presented in the next section. We next describe the policy 
context of public service social enterprises (or mutuals) and the research methods. The 
findings are then presented, followed by a discussion and elaboration of the contribution to 
knowledge. In concluding we also reflect on some limitations of the study and suggest 
avenues for further research. 
 
Theoretical context of governance and ownership  
 
Definitions of corporate governance typically centre on the structures and relationships that 
allow various participants to direct and control organisational performance (e.g. Hansmann 
1988; Monks and Minow 1995). Governance provides the structure through which the 
objectives of a company are determined and the means by which they are attained and 
monitored (OECD 2004). Also identified as central in defining governance are ‘a set of 
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders’ (OECD 2004, p.1). Hence there is a need to attend to the nature of the 
relationships between the various participants in governance, and how this shapes the 




Pioneering work by Low (2006) posited that, because social enterprises include elements of 
both non-profit and for-profit sectors, their governance arrangements need to be understood 
as hybrid forms that combine the stewardship model (primarily), as generally associated with 
the private corporate sector; and the democratic (stakeholder) model, which is commonly 
associated with mutuals and cooperatives (Cornforth 2003; 2004; Fazzi 2012; Sacchetti and 
Birchall 2018). A key question relates to how these two models are combined in practice and 
change in how they are balanced is negotiated over time. Social enterprise leaders may be 
confronted with pressures from different participants to prioritise either the stewardship or 
stakeholder model and will need to navigate a way through this tension. Newly founded 
organisations in particular are likely to prioritise stewardship but with the aim of engaging 
stakeholders in a more inclusive and participative approach over time as the organisation 
develops and grows.  
 
Low (2006) examined the factors that determine which trajectory social enterprises take in 
relation to these two models of governance, focusing on the legal forms adopted, their trading 
activities, and the finance sources utilised. The issue of trading as a route to securing a 
financial surplus in order to support social missions is particularly pertinent here, with Low 
(2006, p.382) arguing that the complexities involved are ‘likely to drive a requirement for a 
more stewardship driven form of governance that relies less on representing diverse 
[stakeholder] interests and more on a board that is capable of managing assets for greater 
return’. Nevertheless, the objective of democratic governance requires that social enterprise 
management and strategy simultaneously serve the legitimate interest of all stakeholders, i.e. 
including employees, service users and the local community (Low 2006), while promoting 
their representation and participation in organisational decision-making. The range of 
governance challenges (Spear et al. 2009) and areas of potential governance failure (Low and 
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Chinnock 2008) include: the recruitment of suitable board members; the choice of legal 
structure; managing the interests of different stakeholder groups; managing the relationship 
between boards and management teams; and how to balance social and financial objectives.  
 
In their capacity as agents of the shareholders and stakeholders, managers and boards have a 
duty to act in the interest of the owners of the organisation and, in theory, governance 
arrangements are established to serve this interest. However, there is a lack of clarity in the 
literature regarding how this works in practice and particularly so in the case of newly created 
social enterprises which can take different legal forms and constitutional arrangements for 
democratic ownership and governance. Accordingly, there is a need for a more nuanced 
understanding of democratic and participative governance as a multi-layered organisational 
process, and how this plays out in different contexts, including where such ideals may remain 
under-realised despite the best intentions of leaders and key stakeholders. A way forward is 
suggested by arguments relating to empowerment and voice (Mason et al. 2007) by which 
stakeholders can have agency and influence whether or not they have fully-realised legal 
rights and/or a financial interest in the enterprise (Dundon et al. 2004; Wilkinson 1998).  
 
Following this argument, engaged ownership cannot just rely on a formal ‘bundle of legal 
rights’ (Pierce et al. 2001) but also requires ‘a psychological state of mind’, with the 
implication that the latter can be nurtured by organisational practices and culture change. As 
Mayhew et al. (2007, p.408) propose, ‘positive outcomes of organisations’ formal ownership 
systems depend on members’ developing a sense of psychological ownership’, which suggests 
that ‘ownership is part ‘real’ and part in the ‘mind’’ (Pierce and Rodgers 2004, p.590). 
Critically, psychological ownership is seen as the result of a positive process of engaging, 
empowering and involving employees and other stakeholders, such as service users, in 
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decision making processes (Cox et al. 2006; Humborstad 2014; Mayhew et al. 2007). This 
expanded conception suggested by the notion of psychological ownership can also be linked 
to a more collective or cultural dimension of governance and is methodologically useful in 
that it serves to group together competing yet similar concepts from the sociology of 
organisations and management disciplines, such as employee and stakeholder engagement, 
participation, satisfaction, voice and sense of belonging, among others (Dundon et al. 2007; 
Shuck and Wollard 2010). Accordingly, our understanding of inclusive and democratic 
governance, and our working definition, embraces the actual practices and cultures of 
engagement and enfranchisement, as well as the forms and structures adopted by 
organisations to this effect. This working definition underpins our approach to the central 
research question which is now revised in light of our review of the literature:  How does the 
interplay between formal (structural) and less formal (cultural-psychological) dimensions 
give rise to specific ownership and governance outcomes in public service social enterprises?     
 




Although the phenomenon of social enterprises spinning out from the public sector is not new 
in Britain, it became particularly salient in the second half of the 2000s as an aspect of central 
government’s public sector and welfare reform agenda (Hazenberg and Hall 2016; Sepulveda 
2015). The political support for this agenda has entailed a drive to increase the diversity of 
organisations that provide public services, including by shifting services from direct state 
control and ownership and transforming them into independent social enterprises, or public 
service mutuals (Cabinet Office 2010; Mutuals Taskforce 2011). This was initially promoted 
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within the health and social care sectors in England where the Department of Health’s Right 
to Request programme, launched in 2011 by the New Labour government, provided the 
institutional basis for public sector service employees to establish themselves as independent 
social enterprises (DH 2008; 2009; Hall et al. 2012; Sepulveda et al. 2018), with substantial 
funding streams (notably the £100 million Social Enterprise Investment Fund) being 
specifically allocated to support their capacity building. Other related government legislation 
includes the Localism Act (2011) which devolves powers to communities, giving them ‘the 
right to challenge’ existing public service delivery models as well as ‘the right to bid’ to buy 
assets of community value (e.g. local shops, libraries and pubs); and the Public Services 
(Social Value) Act 2012 which requires public sector commissioners to consider how the 
services they commission and procure might improve the economic, social and environmental 
wellbeing of an area. 
 
One of the defining characteristics of these organisations is that, as a condition of their 
receiving state support, they are expected to grant a significant role to employees in their 
ownership and governance (Birchall 2008; Cabinet Office 2010; 2011; Mutuals Task Force 
2011; Transition Institute 2011; 2013). This expectation is reflected in the current definition 
provided by the UK government: ‘Public Service Mutuals are organisations which have left 
the formal public sector, continue to deliver public services and aim to have a positive social 
impact, and have a significant degree of employee ownership, influence or control in the way 
the organisation is run’ (1). This policy expectation and associated support for ‘mutuals’ to 
adopt broadly democratic forms was also found to resonate with the preferences and 
aspirations of the leaders and many employees within the pre-spinout services. The threat of a 
hollowing-out, closure or privatisation of public services prompted debates among leaders 
and employees, with the idea of empowering staff (primarily), including in terms of being 
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able to be more innovative in how they respond to the needs of user communities, emerging 




The empirical study on which the paper draws was concerned with the contribution of public 
service social enterprises/mutuals to innovation and included a focus on the role of 
governance and democratic ownership in these newly-created organisations. A qualitative 
multi-case study approach was adopted (Bryman 2006) to gain the breadth and depth of 
insight needed to address the research question and to be able to compare, contrast and 
generalise from evidence gained from multiple cases. The study began with a review of the 
specialised literature and analysis of existing secondary data on the size and profile of the 
emerging public service mutual sector in England. This resulted in 63 organisations being 
identified as having left the public sector in the years just prior to the selection process (in 
2012) from which 30 were invited to participate in the study. The sample was purposefully 
selected to be broadly representative of the diversity of the sector and different characteristics 
in terms of size, turnover, geographical location, date of registration, activities and legal form 
adopted. The unusually large sample (i.e. for a qualitative case study approach) also has the 
advantage of capturing a variety of approaches, stages and outcomes related to democratic 
governance and ownership, thus making the analysis and resulting typology more robust.  
 
These organisations primarily delivered services related to community health, wellbeing and 
social care (see Table I). Most were fairly new at the time of the fieldwork, with 19 of the 30 
having been established from 2011 onwards when the British government’s Right to Request 
Programme became operative. This is methodologically relevant in that most were at an early 
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stage of establishing and embedding their governance arrangements, having only recently 






















































 No of 
employees Turnover Main activity 
Legal form 
1 2011 1100 £50,000,000 Community healthcare 
Community Interest Company 
(CIC) – Company Limited by 
Shares (CLS) 
2 2011 1700 £50,000,000 Community 
health/social care 
CIC – Company Limited by 
Guarantee (CLG) 
3 2007 25 £250,000 
Adults with learning 
disabilities CIC – CLS 
4 1994 360 £5,500,000 Elderly home care Share Investment Plan (SIP) 
5 1997 700 £15,000,000 Residential respite & 
day care services Charity – CLG 
6 2007 55 £2,200,000 
Primary care (General 
Practitioners) CIC – CLS 
7 2011 25 £925,000 Mental health CIC – CLS 
8 2010 600 £25,000,000 Community healthcare CIC – CLG 
9 2011 1250 £47,000,000 Community healthcare CIC – CLS 
10 2010 15 £900,000 Primary healthcare CIC – CLS 
11 2011 850 £30,000,000 Community healthcare CIC – CLS 
 
12 2011 50 £272,940 Mental health Industrial & Provident Society (IPS)* Bencomm 
13 2011 170 £8,000,000 Community 
drug/alcohol services CIC – CLS 
14 2011 500 £21,000,000 Mental health CIC – CLG 
15 2011 46 £2,700,000 Services for disabled 
people CIC – CLG 
16 2011 170 -- End of life care CIC – CLS 
17 2011 1300 £36,000,000 Community services CIC – CLG 
18 2011 40 £1,200,000 Children's mental health CIC – CLS 
19 2011 40 £600,000 Adults with learning 
disabilities Charity – CLG 
20 2011 300 £16,000,000 Community healthcare CIC – CLS 
21 2011 2082 £87,000,000 Community healthcare CIC – CLG 
22 2011 2000 £90,000,000 Community healthcare CIC – CLG 
23 2005 200 £6,000,000 Adults with learning 
disabilities Charity – CLG 
24 2013 16 -- 
Adults with learning 
disabilities CIC – CLS 
25 2011 40 £1,000,000 Social care CIC – CLS 
26 2006 4 £100,000 Primary care CIC – CLG 
27 2011 10 £888,000 Community healthcare CIC – CLG 
28 2002 350 £7,000,000 Leisure, fitness and 
health rehabilitation IPS* bona fide 
29 1992 62 -- 
Leisure, fitness and 
health rehabilitation Charity – CLG 
30 2002 2500 £40,000,000 
Leisure, fitness and 
health rehabilitation IPS* Bencomm 






For each of the 30 selected organisations, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
CEOs (total n=29), senior and junior members of the staff (including some trade union 
representatives) (n=166), service users or patients from the local community (n=39), and key 
external stakeholders (e.g. commissioners of public services) (n=39), with an average of nine 
interviews per organisation. Different subgroups of interviewees (i.e.  CEOs, employees) 
were purposely selected for further in-depth analysis as required. As for the reliability of the 
information supplied by the 29 CEOs (the main source of data for some key variables), we 
were able to test their views against those of other informants, such as senior managers, more 
junior staff members and, in some cases, trade union/employee representatives within the 
same organisation.  
 
Of particular relevance for this paper were the set of questions concerned with the 
governance arrangements, whether fully adopted or in process of being established, and 
views on how these mechanisms were working in practice. Also explored were interviewees’ 
perceptions of changes to the organisational culture and evidence of innovation (both service 
and organisational) since leaving the public sector.  
 
The first stage of the interpretative analysis drew out the emerging themes in relation to the 
key variables (or parent nodes) (Boyatzis 1998) with the help of the NVivo software package. 
Each transcript was coded by at least two team members to ensure consistency and reliability 
in the identification of key themes and sub-themes (or child nodes). In the first stage, the data 
was classified under three main thematic axes (first order/parent codes) as derived from the 
literature and supported by the initial NVivo analysis: 
(i) Legal form – rationale for the chosen form and ownership structure at start-up;  
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(ii) Employee representation – formal mechanisms and practices aimed at involving 
employees in decision making (staff councils/board of directors and extent of actual 
involvement) and less formal (cultural-psychological) aspects of participation, 
empowerment voice and sense of belonging; 
(iii) Service user and local community representation – formal arrangements for involving 
stakeholders in governance and actual experiences of stakeholder engagement.  
 
The second stage of analysis involved a further coding of the material selected in the first 
stage to draw out both the formal and less formal dimensions of engagement and 
enfranchisement.  Finally, the third stage delved further into the coded data to explore how 
the interplay of the elements and dimensions previously identified gave rise to specific 
outcomes, or stages in the journey towards democratic governance and ownership. These 
three levels of analysis culminated in the development of the analytical framework, as shown 














Figure I. Stages of coding and analysis of empirical data  
 





Stage 2: types of democratic governance and 
ownership 
Stage 3: interplay 
between formal and 
less formal dimensions 
 
 
i. Legal form 
Choice of form and rationale: 
• Legal forms – different types 
• Arrangements for employee and 
stakeholder ownership 




































Formal structures of representation: 
• Board of directors involving employees 
in decision making  
• Staff councils 
• Actual involvement 
• Inhibited involvement 
 
 
Less formal (cultural-psychological) aspects: 
• Actual participation, including compared 
to when in public sector 
• Feeling empowered and having voice 
• Sense of ownership 









Formal arrangements for involving stakeholders 
 












The findings are presented below in relation to the three broad areas of social enterprise 
governance identified in the literature and justified in our conceptual framework: (i) choice of 
legal form; (ii) employee representation; and (iii) service user and local community 
representation.  
 
(i) Legal form  
 
The legal form adopted by the 30 organisations following their departure from the public 
sector is the starting point of the analysis, given that this relates to the most formalised aspect 
of the governance arrangements established, or ‘legal ownership’ as per the distinction made 
by Pierce et al. (2001) between types of ownership. As shown in Table I, most organisations 
had adopted legal forms which were conducive to multi-stakeholder ownership, with the 
largest group (22 out of 30 organisations) being Community Interest Companies (CICs), a 
relatively new form introduced by the British government in 2005 to accommodate the legal 
and operational requirements of social enterprises (Nicholls 2010). The main feature of the 
CIC form is that it incorporates a lock on the company’s assets and restrictions to the 
distribution of profits. The flexibility of the CIC form allows choice between different 
constitutional structures and ownership options, whereby membership/ownership can be held 
solely by directors or can variously include – depending on the organisation’s priorities - 
employees, service users, members of the public, or other stakeholder organisations such as 
local authorities. Thirteen of the 22 CICs were registered as Companies Limited by Shares 
(CLS) and nine as Companies Limited by Guarantee (CLG). CIC-CLSs issue share capital in 
fixed amounts, e.g. typically £1 per share, to their ‘shareholders’ who become the ‘owners’ of 
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the company. The nominal amount of the share (e.g. £1) is the extent of the directors’ liability 
in the company. For CIC-CLSs there is a cap on the maximum dividend and interest 
payments it can make, which is currently restricted to no more than 35% of the aggregate 
distributable profits. In a CIC-CLG, instead of share capital or shareholders ‘the members’ 
give a guarantee (or membership fee) to cover the company’s liability. The guarantee is 
‘nominal’ e.g. being limited to £1 (sterling). The members of a CIC-CLG therefore become 
its ‘owners’ and have, broadly speaking, the same powers as those of the ‘shareholders’ in a 
CIC-CLS (2).   
 
Of the remaining eight organisations, four were registered as Charity Companies Limited by 
Guarantee (CLG) - a form commonly adopted by UK charities and nonprofits that trade, 
under which directors purchase a £1 share but with an asset lock restricting any distributions 
of profit or assets. Three organisations were Industrial and Provident Societies (IPS) (or Co-
operative and Community Benefit Societies since August 2014), a long-established form for 
mutuals and cooperatives where there is a principle of employee or stakeholder ownership 
and democratic enfranchisement of members with voting rights. Finally, the sample included 
one example of an employee-owned organisation which had recently changed its legal 
structure from a private Company Limited by Shares to a Share Investment Plan. The 
majority of the organisations had therefore adopted legal forms that were conducive to multi-
stakeholder ownership – i.e. including both employees and user communities - although most 
had chosen constitutional structures which prioritised the enfranchisement of employees, in 





Regarding the 22 CICs, all had implemented either a ‘shareholder’ or a ‘membership’ system 
(in 13 CIC-CLSs and nine CIC-CLGs respectively) thus enabling employees and service 
users, in theory, to become non- dividend shareholders or members (on paying £1). For CIC 
employees, acquiring ‘shareholder’ or ‘member’ status can happen either automatically or by 
making use of an ‘opt-in’ clause in the job contract. The first option, found in most (20 of the 
22) CICs, occurs automatically after six or twelve months of full-time working for the 
organisation (i.e. the employee becomes a £1 owner) – although an ‘opt-out’ provision is 
generally included for those who do not wish to become shareholders or members. In the 
second option (just two cases in our sample), after six or twelve months of full-time working 
for the organisation, the employee either ‘opts-in’ to affirm their decision to become a 
shareholder or member or they are automatically ‘opted-out’. 
 
There was considerable variation between the 22 CICs with respect to the proportion of 
eligible employees who had become shareholders or members, ranging from 30% at the 
bottom end to 98% at the top end of the range. Unsurprisingly, employee shareholding and 
membership was highest in the two organisations that had formalised an opt-out provision 
(50% to 98% - average 75%); whereas organisations adopting the opt-in clause exhibited 
much lower levels of between 30% to 50% (e.g. cases 9 and 21). Hence when employees 
were presented with the decision to ‘become an owner’ (or opt-in), a proxy for employees’ 
demand for legal ownership, an average of just 40% across the sample elected to do so, and 
60% preferred to remain as ‘ordinary wage-earners’ without ownership rights.  
 
The choice between an opt-in or an opt-out clause was a somewhat controversial matter 
according to CEO interviewees, further highlighting the importance of distinguishing 
between the different types and mechanisms of ownership (Pierce et al. 2001; Pierce and 
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Rodgers 2004). For instance, one CEO was emphatic that he saw ‘automatic ownership’ (i.e. 
the opt-out clause) as ‘cheating’ and argued that leaders needed to first gain employees’ trust 
and interest in order to pave the way for extending the provisions of full (legal) ownership. 
Another CEO similarly expressed his preference for a positive ‘opt-in’ and that ‘persuading 
and engaging’ was preferable to ‘telling’ staff that they were suddenly ‘owners’ of the 
organisation. When asked about the extent of employee ownership, another CEO in this 
group shed further light on the difficulty of extending and embedding a ‘feeling’ or ‘sense’ of 
ownership, also indicating a degree of ambiguity in a context where organisations had, until 
recently, been publicly owned: 
 
Staff ownership? Well, it started off at about 20% of people that felt like they had 
ownership. It’s about 80% now, so there’s still some people who don’t really have a 
sense of ownership. All the staff are owners. But what the surveys were telling us is 
that there’s a different percentage of people that feel like they have that ownership. So 
it’s a bit like me saying, ‘Here’s this sofa, you can have it.’ And you say, ’Oh, I don’t 
really want it! I’m happy to sit on it, but I don’t really want to own it.’ I think that’s 
the difficulty when you spin-out of the public sector, because no one really owns these 
things. And actually forcing people to own things doesn’t seem quite right either. 
What do you do if a member of staff says, ‘Well I don’t want to own this thing, thank 
you very much. Thanks for the offer, but no I don’t want to own it.’ Some people have 
said that and we need to think about how we address that.  
 
The evidence from across the cases therefore shows that extending employee ownership can 
be a slow and difficult process that needs to be understood in relation to other aspects of 




(ii) Employee representation.  
 
Most of the organisations had implemented or were in the process of implementing formal 
democratic mechanisms for representing the views and preferences of employees within 
organisational strategy and decision-making. Analysis of the interview evidence allows us to 
categorise the 30 cases in terms of three levels (or stages) of implementation, with seven at a 
high level or advanced stage (Cases 1, 3, 4, 9, 13, 16, 20), twelve exhibiting some partial 
adoption (8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28), and eleven showing no or minimal 
presence of formal mechanisms (2, 5, 6, 7, 11, 18, 21, 22, 25, 29, 30).    
 
All of the seven cases identified as being at an advanced stage had both employee 
shareholding or membership systems in place and formal structures for employee 
representation and mechanisms for enabling participation in strategy and decision-making. 
Some of these organisations appeared to be the least hierarchical and exhibited the most 
horizontal governance structures in the entire sample, in line with the democratic 
(stakeholder) model.  
 
Specific mechanisms for involving employees in decision-making included an elected staff 
council of shareholders (in the case of CIC-CLS registered companies); a staff council of 
members (in the CIC-CLGs), or staff representation on a council of governors. Although 
these forums were often non-executive employee-led bodies, in some cases they were 
responsible for key corporate decisions such as appointing the chair of the board of directors 
(or governors) and the CEO. These bodies also had power, albeit to varying degrees, to hold 
the board of directors (i.e. the shareholders’ agent by definition) to account and thereby exert 
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real authority and influence over the operations and strategic direction of the organisation 
(Low 2015). Critically, the employees of all seven organisations in this group were also 
represented on the board of directors via an (often) elected member of staff. In response to a 
question on the extent of employee engagement, one senior manager explained:  
 
We’ve certainly set up the staff engagement side of things very differently […]. What's 
integral to our governance structure is a council of governors. They are elected 
members from staff, they are not [trade] union reps, they’re staff representatives and 
they’re voted from different cohorts of the staff groups. They have quite a lot of power 
around appointing non-execs, and the chairman. They also take responsibilities 
around other corporate issues and [there is also] the fact that all our staff are 
shareholders, so they’re offered the opportunity to be shareholders and have a 
nominal [£1 pound] share. 
 
An important group of organisations (11 out of 30) corresponded to the stewardship (top-
down) model of governance. Arrangements for employee representation (e.g. on their boards 
of directors or other employee-led bodies, such as councils of governors) were absent or 
minimal in this group, and in the few cases that did include staff representatives on their 
boards, these had been appointed by CEOs rather than being democratically elected by 
employees. Finally, in some cases shareholding and membership opportunities had been 
restricted to certain categories rather than being open to staff at all levels, including two cases 
where only the CEO, some senior managers and board members were deemed eligible. 
 
Having analysed the governance forms adopted, we now turn to how these were working in 
practice, focusing on perceptions of effectiveness and any mismatches between the rationale 
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for their establishment and actual outcomes. Evidence from across the cases and from 
different categories of interviewees (e.g. CEOs, senior managers and junior staff members) 
shows employee participation and involvement in decision-making to have been a slow and 
difficult process, even in those cases that appeared to be the most advanced in embedding 
employee ownership in their structures and practices.  
 
In some cases, it was particularly apparent that employees’ lack of confidence in their 
abilities and lack of belief in the validity of their potential contribution was inhibiting their 
involvement in decision-making (i.e. an agency problem). One organisation had gone so far 
as to set up a ‘staff engagement group’ to address such a failure of democratic governance 
(Low and Chinnock 2008). The following quotation from an employee representative of a 
medium-sized organisation illustrates how the responsibility involved can be experienced as 
daunting and the need for a supportive context to develop the confidence of newly-appointed 
staff representatives:  
 
I am on the board. It was quite scary to start with to be honest. I was voted in by the 
staff as the staff board member. I felt quite inadequate to start with because there 
were these business people on the board and when they spoke about the finances, to 
be honest, it went across the top of my head, I’m not that way inclined, it was like, 
‘What am I doing here?’ But now I go in with them and I just say what I want to say 
as well. I know that my role within the board is completely different to my role 
working for [the organisation] and if I’ve got something to say, I will say it as a board 
member, regardless of whether [the Chief Exec]’s actually there, as a board member 
as well […] We were meeting every month to start with and at the third board meeting 
I said, ‘I’ve got to hold my hands up and say this: this terrifies me every time I’m 
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coming here I’m so worried about what you lot think of me because I just feel so 
inadequate to be here.’ And one of the other board members said, ‘Do you know, I 
feel exactly the same.’ And I thought, ‘I’m so pleased I said it.’  
  
This illustrates how the introduction of legal forms and mechanisms alone is unlikely to be 
sufficient, and the need to understand and respond to stakeholders’ actual experiences of 
democratic inclusion and empowerment. Nevertheless, evidence from across the cases largely 
supports that the new organisational cultures were experienced as being much less restrictive 
than had been the case in the public sector. In half of the cases employee interviewees clearly 
expressed how they felt more empowered to contribute to decision making than when their 
organisation had been part of the public sector (Cases 1, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 23, 
25, 27, 28). The following quotations illustrate how employees perceived the advantages of 
the new social enterprise status in terms of having a voice and influence:   
 
‘I think the advantages are that we now are very, very staff focussed. […] we have more 
opportunity to put forward what we think we should be doing and where we think we should 
be heading. […] as a social enterprise, staff are very much encouraged, and really 
empowered to have a massive part in the decision making.’ Case 1 
 
‘As a social enterprise, I think we’ve got more say in how things work. Our ideas are listened 
to and not just forced on to us.’ Case 17 
 
‘[I]t is quite good that it is an open door policy and you can have an opinion and express it 
and be listened to, really.’ Case 28 
 
Although ‘open door’ policies have long been advocated in the business and corporate world 
as a way of encouraging openness and transparency between senior management and 
employees, in many of our cases employees also expressed a strong sense of ownership and 
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belonging that was also linked to their involvement in decision making and ability to 
contribute to positive outcomes including service improvements and innovation: 
 
‘I think working as a team where the team truly do have a voice and can shape the service. 
[…] Because everybody has that shared sense of ownership.’ Case 10 
 
‘[N]ow people have a real, kind of, strong identity of belonging to this organisation, owning 
this organisation, being part of the running of this organisation.’ Case 14 
 
‘I think there’s more opportunity for people in the front line to be innovative in how to 
redesign service. […] So there’s a feeling of a bit of ownership around what we need to 
change.’ Case 9 
 
This is evidence of the cultural-psychological dimension of ownership, with 15 cases 
exhibiting strong evidence of such engagement and participation in decision making, and 
with 12 of these cases also having strong formal mechanisms for democratic governance and 
ownership in place. In terms of employee representation, however, only five appeared to have 
achieved an advanced or ‘high level’ of adoption (Cases 1, 4, 9, 13, 16), with most exhibiting 
some partial (Cases 8, 10, 14, 17, 19, 23, 27, 28) or only a minimal level of adoption of 
formal mechanisms (Cases 11, 25).  
 
Our cross-case analysis therefore shows how the transition from the public sector to social 
enterprise status has involved significant changes in the culture of most organisations.  Some 
CEO interviewees identified the need for further such change in order for their vision of 
employee ownership to be more fully realised, with one suggesting a need for a shift from the 
more ‘autocratic’ style of leadership which had driven the transition from the public sector to 
an approach which could enable a more democratic, multi-stakeholder model. CEOs in two 
other cases referred to this as involving a gradual process of evolution rather than revolution, 
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also pointing out that a culture of democratic inclusion had been a key feature when they 
were part of the public sector. 
  
These findings support the proposition that ownership needs to be understood as a cultural-
psychological phenomenon as well as a legally formalised property. The findings also 
demonstrate the challenges experienced when attempting to embed and develop democratic 
culture and inclusive practice within organisations. Hence the need to explore and understand 
the interplay between legal forms and mechanisms and the processes of culture change within 
organisations. 
 
(iii) Users and local community representation 
 
As previously explained, public policy and support for public service mutuals in England has 
prioritised the enfranchisement of employees and has not seen the same weight being 
attached to user/community ownership and involvement. However, although none of the 30 
cases had specifically designed their constitutions to extend shareholding/membership to their  
user communities, six appeared to have taken a particular lead in directly involving 
representatives of this key group, thus corresponding to the multi-stakeholder model of 
governance (Low 2015). Of these six, two claimed to have moved from a ‘dual’ governance 
system, i.e. controlled by senior managers and boards of directors in combination with 
employees and a council of governors, towards a ‘tripartite’ system, where service users were 
also accorded voice and decision-making power through mechanisms such as user advisory 




We also find that directly involving service users and engaging them in the governance of the 
enterprise can be at least as challenging as involving employees, if not more so.  
Organisations were faced with a number of challenges, starting with the problem of defining 
who their ‘users’ and ‘local community’ stakeholders were for governance purposes: should 
representation be limited to those who actively made use of the services provided or should it 
also include individuals who are registered with the service but not making active use of it? 
Where does the ‘local community’ start and where does it end? And who best represents it? 
 
In two exceptional cases, CEOs emphasised the primacy of their service users and that 
engaging them in decision making took precedence over employee involvement, in the sense 
that the former were at the core of their ‘ideal governance structure’. Interviewees at one of 
these organisations described their model as an ‘inverted triangle of governance’, with the 
executive team at the bottom of the triangle, the employees in the middle, and service users 
and patients at the top. In this case, the organisation’s board of directors was composed of 
service users (mainly people with learning disabilities) and with supportive steering from the 
CEO, who further indicated the cultural change involved and their innovative approach to 
engaging users in service design and delivery: 
 
We’re increasingly of the view that we have created dependency in the system, both 
from the point of view of individuals [service users] and how we’ve engaged them but 
particularly with regards to communities. And so our whole direction now is 
changing that basic relationship […] And that's a fairly significant cultural shift for 
us, [including in terms of] the whole relationship between local government and the 
citizen. So I think when you start to deliver some of these [services] through a much 
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more community-based model, you break down some of those barriers that currently 
exist. 
 
For most organisations, however, engaging service users in governance and decision-making 
was experienced as particularly challenging, with all organisations in this group reporting 
significant difficulties. For instance, surveys launched by some organisations – i.e. in order to 
gather information about their users and obtain feedback on the services provided and 
suggestions for improvement – typically drew low response rates. Participation in service 
user and community forums was also generally much lower than in forums for employees, 
and often limited to small groups of ‘the same people’ and ‘self-appointed patient or 
community leaders’, as expressed by one CEO. In the community healthcare cases, such 
apparent failures of democratic governance may also relate to the sectoral context, which is 
characterised by high levels of information asymmetry between health professionals and low-
income and vulnerable service users in particular who may be lacking in the confidence and 




There is increasing interest in the potential of democratic governance and ownership amongst 
social enterprises, nonprofits and policy makers concerned with promoting a more inclusive 
economy. We have addressed a gap in the literature on social enterprise governance 
(Cornforth, 2003, 2004; Diochon, 2010; Doherty; Fazzi, 2012; Low, 2006; Mason et al. 2007; 
Spear, Cornforth et al. 2009) by shedding light on the complexities and challenges posed in 
the novel context of public service social enterprises in England where there has been a 
particular policy interest in mutual ownership and democratic governance (Cabinet Office 
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2010; 2011). We have shown how the implementation of formal governance arrangements 
needs to be understood in relation to the specific processes and practices by which 
organisations seek to engage employees and other stakeholders, notably service users. In 
doing so, we have drawn on a conception of ownership as being both a formal/legal property 
as well as a cultural-psychological phenomenon. Specifically, the analysis shows how 
elements of both the stewardship (Davis et al.1997; Donaldson and David 1991) and 
democratic multi-stakeholder models have been variously adopted by organisations and often 
in combination (Cornforth 2003; Low 2006).  The findings reveal the variety of approaches 
and outcomes amongst a set of organisations with similar origins, engaged in similar 
activities and with broadly similar commitments to participatory governance.  
 
Based on these findings, Figure II presents a framework to capture the varied outcomes (or 
stages) involved. The vertical axis shows a continuum between multi-stakeholder 
representation and stewardship representation, while the horizontal axis captures the 

































Organisations which most closely exemplify the mutual ‘ideal’, or multi-stakeholder 
approach, effectively combine legal ownership and other formal mechanisms with the 
cultural-psychological dimension of ownership and fall into the top right quadrant of Figure 
II. Our analysis of 30 cases found that only five had achieved an advanced or high level of 
adoption of formal mechanisms and that the mutualisation process in these organisations had 
been strongly supported by the cultural-psychological dimension of empowerment and 
ownership.  
 
The other three quadrants capture outcomes which, in line with our analysis of democratic 
governance and ownership as a gradual and often challenging process, may also be stages in 
an organisation’s journey towards democratisation. The bottom left quadrant captures those 
cases where the stewardship approach to ownership and representation was predominant, 
Stakeholders’ 
engaged but no 
























with little progress beyond some limited provision for formal or legal ownership by staff (or 
other stakeholders) and where democratic stakeholder representation had not been pursued. 
These cases therefore exemplify stewardship with limited engagement, where directors and 
board members act as stewards for the beneficiaries and other stakeholders who are only 
democratically involved in decision-making to a limited extent, if at all. This is the most 
common form of ‘ownership’ across the wider non-profit sector. 
 
There were other cases that lacked formal provision for employee or community ownership 
but where stewardship ownership co-existed alongside a considerable degree of stakeholder 
engagement and involvement in decision making. This is shown in the top left quadrant of 
Figure II. These cases exhibited a high degree of inclusivity and empowerment through 
having developed the ‘cultural’ component of ownership or ‘psychological ownership’ 
(Pierce et al. 2001). 
 
Our analysis also revealed several examples of attempts to develop (multi-) stakeholder 
ownership but with a weak (or still developing) culture of participation and engagement. 
Organisations in this group fall into the bottom right quadrant of Figure II.  This is likely to 
reflect a number of factors: the relative newness of many of the organisations examined; the 
nature of the sector, particularly with respect to healthcare; and the pressures of a competitive 
trading context requiring a board to guide the organisation’s strategy, delivery of complex 
public services (i.e. healthcare in particular) and management of the organisation’s assets. 
This was found to be particularly apparent in cases where mutual forms had only recently 
been introduced and where staff had to opt-out of legal ownership, rather than actively opt-in 
to take on the ownership role. Organisations in this group exemplify a limited, tokenistic or 
forced mutuality. Although the stakeholder models adopted offer opportunities for staff (and 
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to a lesser extent service user) representation and involvement in decision making, these are 
often not fully realised and there may be agency problems related to stakeholders’ lack of 
motivation and/or confidence in their ability to participate in organisational governance and 
so fully exert their (legal) ownership rights (Mayhew et al. 2007). 
 
Organisational journeys towards democratic governance and ownership are often complex 
and challenging processes for all involved. This paper shows how the adoption of legal forms 
alone do not create multi-stakeholder ownership, and how the achievement of democratic 
ideals often involves an evolutionary process of structure and culture change within 
organisations. Our evidence specifically shows that formal governance mechanisms designed 
to facilitate employee representation and ownership are necessary but insufficient, and that 
there is a need to attend to the desires and motivations for participation and involvement 
which may be nascent and in need of nurturing. Legal ownership on its own is thus unlikely 
to have a major effect unless it is accompanied by a supportive process involving debate 
amongst key stakeholders, changes to the organisational culture and experimentation with 
new practices and approaches. This also has a major implication for leadership styles and 
highlights the importance of managing culture change within organisations as they seek to 
shift between the different possible governance outcomes/categories (as shown in Figure II)  
in response to the influence of key stakeholders and other contextual pressures. We have 
shown how particular organisational practices and forms of leadership are needed to facilitate 
cultural change, as well as legal and other formal mechanisms for multi-stakeholder 
representation and engagement. These changes in turn require organisation leaders to gain the 
trust and commitment of employees (Ohana et al. 2012) and user communities, thus 
encouraging them to participate in the decision-making process. In this way, formal 
ownership structures are more likely to be fully utilised rather than remaining as ‘empty 
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boxes’ and/or ‘stewardship devices’ that ultimately, reflect a failure of democratic 
governance (Low and Chinnock 2008). 
 
Most of the organisations examined had prioritised the enfranchisement of employees over 
user/community stakeholders (at the time of the research fieldwork, at least). As well as being 
in line with the policy guidelines and supportive framework for public service mutuals, this 
‘bias’ towards employees is also likely to reflect the greater difficulty and complexity of 
engaging service users, which may also be exacerbated by issues related to the healthcare 
sector context of many of our case study organisations. Nevertheless, we have shown how 
some organisations had made progress in this direction and the greater enfranchisement of 
user communities is likely to be a feature of the evolving policy agenda for public service 
mutuals. Models for such development include the Somerset Co-operative Model and the 
FairShares Model in Britain (see Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2019) and internationally (see 
Sacchetti and Birchall 2018). This is an important area for future research, particularly with 
respect to the potential for user community engagement in a greater diversity of sectoral 




We conclude by observing that, although public service social enterprises/mutuals represent 
an opportunity to develop and implement alternative forms of governance that are conducive 
to democratic ownership and representation, putting these principles into practice can be far 
from straightforward. As seen, no matter how much encouragement and support 
organisations receive, employee and community/service user ownership and democratic 
governance are likely to remain elusive if these principles are not underpinned by suitable 
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legal forms, inclusive organisational cultures, visionary leadership and concrete actions that 
are in line with the organisation’s social mission: it is neither structure nor culture, but rather 
a synergistic interplay of the two that matters. This is our main contribution to knowledge, 
particularly to the literature on social enterprise governance (Cornforth, 2003, 2004; Diochon, 
2010; Doherty; Fazzi, 2012; Low, 2006; Mason et al. 2007; Spear, Cornforth et al. 2009) 
where the two dimensions of organisational governance and their interplay have not been 
comprehensively examined. Our framework of governance outcomes (Figure II) offers an 
ideal type model with four possible outcomes (or stages) which can be applied to the study of 
social enterprises more generally, whether or not they are seeking to democratise their 
governance structures. We contend that this framework has potential in terms of the further 
exploration of the impact of governance arrangements on other organisational spheres, 
including the productivity and performance of mutuals and other mission-led or profit-with-
purpose businesses (Hollensbe et al. 2014; George et al. 2016). 
 
There are some limitations to this study which also suggest avenues for further research.  
Although the paper draws on a sizable sample of organisational cases, the research design has 
been qualitative and there is a need for larger sample surveys of social enterprises including 
employees and other stakeholders, notably service users, to further examine the relationship 
between the adoption of legal/constitutional forms, actual practices and the cultural-
psychological dimension of ownership. Additionally, we have focused on a particular type of 
social enterprise, operating in a particular sectoral context in England, which limits the 
generalisation of the findings. There is therefore a need for further research which examines 
these issues in other social enterprise and civil society sector contexts. Also of value would 
be further longitudinal research that explores the particularities of public service social 
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enterprises and how democratic governance evolves by being enabled, challenged or 





(1) https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/public-service-mutuals (Accessed May 2019) 
(2) For further details see: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/community-interest-
companies-how-to-form-a-cic; https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-handbook-for-
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